Apply STRIDE methodology to systematically identify threats

Stride analysis patterns

by wshobson · MIT license · ★ 39,857 on GitHub · updated Sep 21

Apply STRIDE methodology to systematically identify threats. Use when analyzing system security, conducting threat modeling sessions, or creating security documentation.

---
name: stride-analysis-patterns
description: Apply STRIDE methodology to systematically identify threats. Use when analyzing system security, conducting threat modeling sessions, or creating security documentation.
---

# STRIDE Analysis Patterns

Systematic threat identification using the STRIDE methodology.

## When to Use This Skill

- Starting new threat modeling sessions
- Analyzing existing system architecture
- Reviewing security design decisions
- Creating threat documentation
- Training teams on threat identification
- Compliance and audit preparation

Overview

Systematic threat identification using the STRIDE methodology.

Manual install (npx, ZIP)

Claude Codenpx skills add wshobson/agents --skill stride-analysis-patterns -g -a claude-code

Claude Code (manual)

mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills && curl -sL https://codeload.github.com/wshobson/agents/tar.gz/4236bb91f839 \
  | tar -xz -C ~/.claude/skills --strip-components=4 agents-4236bb91f839/plugins/security-scanning/skills/stride-analysis-patterns

Windows (PowerShell)

New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force "$HOME\.claude\skills" | Out-Null; Invoke-WebRequest "https://m.agentalley.io/zip/fb30a667bf91d965ed0d/stride-analysis-patterns.zip" -OutFile "$env:TEMP\stride-analysis-patterns.zip"; Expand-Archive "$env:TEMP\stride-analysis-patterns.zip" -DestinationPath "$HOME\.claude\skills" -Force

Claude.ai / desktopDownload the ZIP and upload it under Settings → Capabilities → Skills.

Codex, Cursor, other agentsPoint them at SKILL.md. The other files are plain text.

Connects with Agent Alley MCP · agentalley.io/mcp

Files included

SKILL.md2.4 KB
references/1 file · 18.1 KB

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Outline

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STRIDE Analysis Patterns

Systematic threat identification using the STRIDE methodology.

When to Use This Skill

Starting new threat modeling sessions
Analyzing existing system architecture
Reviewing security design decisions
Creating threat documentation
Training teams on threat identification
Compliance and audit preparation

Core Concepts

1. STRIDE Categories

S - Spoofing       → Authentication threats
T - Tampering      → Integrity threats
R - Repudiation    → Non-repudiation threats
I - Information    → Confidentiality threats
    Disclosure
D - Denial of      → Availability threats
    Service
E - Elevation of   → Authorization threats
    Privilege

2. Threat Analysis Matrix

Category	Question	Control Family
Spoofing	Can attacker pretend to be someone else?	Authentication
Tampering	Can attacker modify data in transit/rest?	Integrity
Repudiation	Can attacker deny actions?	Logging/Audit
Info Disclosure	Can attacker access unauthorized data?	Encryption
DoS	Can attacker disrupt availability?	Rate limiting
Elevation	Can attacker gain higher privileges?	Authorization

Templates and detailed worked examples

Full template library lives in references/details.md. Read that file when you need concrete templates for this skill.

Best Practices

Do's

Involve stakeholders - Security, dev, and ops perspectives
Be systematic - Cover all STRIDE categories
Prioritize realistically - Focus on high-impact threats
Update regularly - Threat models are living documents
Use visual aids - DFDs help communication

Don'ts

Don't skip categories - Each reveals different threats
Don't assume security - Question every component
Don't work in isolation - Collaborative modeling is better
Don't ignore low-probability - High-impact threats matter
Don't stop at identification - Follow through with mitigations

1	---
2	name: stride-analysis-patterns
3	description: Apply STRIDE methodology to systematically identify threats. Use when analyzing system security, conducting threat modeling sessions, or creating security documentation.
4	---
5
6	# STRIDE Analysis Patterns
7
8	Systematic threat identification using the STRIDE methodology.
9
10	## When to Use This Skill
11
12	- Starting new threat modeling sessions
13	- Analyzing existing system architecture
14	- Reviewing security design decisions
15	- Creating threat documentation
16	- Training teams on threat identification
17	- Compliance and audit preparation
18
19	## Core Concepts
20
21	### 1. STRIDE Categories
22
23	```
24	S - Spoofing → Authentication threats
25	T - Tampering → Integrity threats
26	R - Repudiation → Non-repudiation threats
27	I - Information → Confidentiality threats
28	Disclosure
29	D - Denial of → Availability threats
30	Service
31	E - Elevation of → Authorization threats
32	Privilege
33	```
34
35	### 2. Threat Analysis Matrix
36
37	\| Category \| Question \| Control Family \|
38	\| ------------------- \| ----------------------------------------- \| -------------- \|
39	\| Spoofing \| Can attacker pretend to be someone else? \| Authentication \|
40	\| Tampering \| Can attacker modify data in transit/rest? \| Integrity \|
41	\| Repudiation \| Can attacker deny actions? \| Logging/Audit \|
42	\| Info Disclosure \| Can attacker access unauthorized data? \| Encryption \|
43	\| DoS \| Can attacker disrupt availability? \| Rate limiting \|
44	\| Elevation \| Can attacker gain higher privileges? \| Authorization \|
45
46	## Templates and detailed worked examples
47
48	Full template library lives in `references/details.md`. Read that file when you need concrete templates for this skill.
49
50	## Best Practices
51
52	### Do's
53
54	- Involve stakeholders - Security, dev, and ops perspectives
55	- Be systematic - Cover all STRIDE categories
56	- Prioritize realistically - Focus on high-impact threats
57	- Update regularly - Threat models are living documents
58	- Use visual aids - DFDs help communication
59
60	### Don'ts
61
62	- Don't skip categories - Each reveals different threats
63	- Don't assume security - Question every component
64	- Don't work in isolation - Collaborative modeling is better
65	- Don't ignore low-probability - High-impact threats matter
66	- Don't stop at identification - Follow through with mitigations
67